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Abstract. The betweenness centrality is one of the basic concepts in the analysis of the social
networks. Initial definition for the betweenness of a node in the graph is based on the fraction of
the number of geodesics (shortest paths) between any two nodes that given node lies on, to the
total number of the shortest paths connecting these nodes. This method has polynomial complexity.
We propose a new concept of the betweenness centrality for weighted graphs using the methods
of cooperative game theory. The characteristic function is determined by special way for different
coalitions (subsets of the graph). Two approaches are used to determine the characteristic function.
In the first approach the characteristic function is determined via the number of direct and indirect
weighted connecting paths in the coalition. In the second approach the coalition is considered as an
electric network and the characteristic function is determined as a total current in this network. We
use the Kirchhoff’s law. After that the betweenness centrality is determined as the Myerson value.
The results of computer simulations for some examples of networks, in particular, for the popular
social network “VKontakte”, as well as the comparing with the PageRank method are presented.
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1. Introduction
The social networks give impulse to the development of new graph-theoretical methods for the analysis
of networks. Social network analysis methods are applied in many fields: economics, physics, sociology,
biology and information technologies.
One of the basic concepts in the analysis of the social networks is betweenness centrality, a measure
of centrality that is based on how well a node i is situated in terms of the paths that it lies on [9]:
cB(i) =
1
nB
∑
s,t∈V
σs,t(i)
σs,t
, (1)
where σs,t is the total number of geodesics (shortest paths) between nodes s and t, σs,t(i) is the number
of geodesics between s and t that i lies on. The denominator nB captures that the node i could lie on
paths between as many as nB = (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 pairs of other nodes. The complexity of the fastest
algorithm to find cB(i) is O(mn) and presented in [6].
To determine a variation of betweenness centrality we will use the methods of cooperative game
theory using the model of the communication game developed by Myerson. Cooperative game is deter-
mined by the set of players N={1,2,. . . ,n} and a characteristic function v(K), utility of a coalition K.
There are many real situations where there is a restriction in the coalition formation. Here we consider a
cooperative game with restricted cooperation which is presented by an undirected communication graph
first developed by Myerson [16]. The network relations are formally represented by graphs whose nodes
are identified with the players and whose arcs capture the pairwise relations. The relation can be in-
terpreted as an information transfer or resource distribution or transport connection. The nodes can be
individuals or organizations or countries or web-pages.
It brings a communication (networking) game determined by a triple which consists of a finite set
of players, a characteristic function and a graph of relations between players. A useful solution of the
communication game is the Myerson value which is characterized by the component efficiency and
pairwise stability.
Efficiency means that for each component of the graph the common payoff is equal to the value of
the component. The stability means that deleting or adding of a connection between two players leads to
equal deviations in payoff allocation for both players.
Jackson and Wolinsky [11] proposed the model of networking game in which the utility depends of
the structure of the network. They apply the Myerson value to analyse the betweenness of the nodes in
the network. Despite the fact that other allocation rules were proposed (see, for instance, [4, 5, 8, 10, 19,
20, 21]), the Myerson vector is widely used as an allocation rule in many cooperative games.
But computing the Myerson value is not an easy problem. In the paper [15] a sufficiently simple
procedure was proposed to calculate the Myerson value for a cooperative game on the unweighted graph
with special characteristic function.
In [7, 17] a centrality measure is defined inspired by a model of electrical circuits. The communica-
tion graph is considered as an electrical network where the vertices of the graph are the network nodes
and the links have some conductivity (reciprocal to resistance). To find the current in the network, the
Kirchhoff’s law is used. At a node s we put a unit current and a node t is grounded. The centrality
measure of a node i is a mean value of the transmitted current over the node i for all possible pairs s
and t. Note that in the definition of the electric measure of centrality definition all possible paths for the
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current are used, not only shortest paths.
The complexity of the best algorithm to find the electric centrality is O(I(n−1)+mn log n), where
I(n− 1) is a complexity to find the inverse matrix of the size n− 1 [7, 17].
In [2] the authors consider a model of electric circuit where the conductivities of the links are constant
and equal to α. In contrast to [7] in the model [2] a new grounded node n + 1 is introduced and each
node of the network is connected with this node with the link of conductivity 1 − α. This approach
allows to decrease the complexity of the algorithm to find the centrality. And hence, there is a possibility
to compute the centrality for large graphs. However this approach was proposed only for unweighted
graphs.
In this paper we propose a new concept of betweenness centrality for weighted graphs using the
methods of cooperative game theory. The characteristic function is determined by special way for differ-
ent coalitions (subsets of the graph). Two approaches are used to determine the characteristic function.
In the first approach the characteristic function is determined by the number of direct and indirect con-
necting paths in the coalition [11]. At that, the weighted graph is transformed into multigraph and then
we use the method proposed in [15].
In the second approach the coalition is considered as an electric network and the characteristic func-
tion is determined as a total current in this network. The current is determined using the Kirchhoff’s
law. After that the betweenness centrality is determined as the Myerson value. The results of computer
simulations for some examples of networks, in particular, for the popular social network “VKontakte”,
as well as the comparing with the PageRank method are presented. Our main conclusion that the electric
centrality measure correlates well with the game-theoretic based centrality measures.
2. Cooperative game and the Myerson value
The betweenness centrality in a network can be determined using game-theoretic approach. Let the nodes
of the network correspond to the set of players in a cooperative game.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of players. Denote 2N the set of all subsets of N . A subset
S ∈ 2N is referred to as a coalition in cooperative game.
Cooperative game of n players is a pair < N ;w > where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players
and w: 2N → R is the map prescribing for a coalition S ∈ 2N some value w(S) such that w(∅) = 0.
This function w(S) is the total utility that members of S can jointly attain. Such function is called the
characteristic function of cooperative game.
Undirected graph g = (N,E) consists of the set of nodes N and the set of links E. We denote the
link as ij. The interpretation is that if ij ∈ E, then the nodes i ∈ N and j ∈ N are directly connected in
graph g, while if ij /∈ E, then nodes i and j are not directly connected.
LetN(g′) = {i : ∃j such that ij ∈ g′}. For a graph g, a sequence of different nodes {i1, i2, . . . , ik}, k ≥
2, is a path connecting i1 and ik if for all h = 1, . . . , k − 1, ihih+1 ∈ g. The length of the path, l, is
the number of links in the path, i.e. l = k − 1. The length of the shortest path connecting i and j is the
distance between i and j. Graph g on the set N is connected graph if for any two nodes i and j there
exists a path in g connecting i and j.
The coalition S is connected if any two nodes in S are connected by a path which consists of nodes
from S. The graph g′ is a component of g, if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′), there exists a path in g′
connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ g′. Let N |g is the set
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of all components in g.
Let g − ij denote the graph obtained by deleting link ij from the graph g and g + ij denote the
graph obtained by adding link ij to the graph g. Let < N, v > is a cooperative game with partial
cooperation presented by graph g and characteristic function v. An allocation rule Y describes how the
value associated with the network is distributed to the individual players. Yi(v, g) is the value to player i
from graph g under the characteristic function v.
Myerson proposed in [16] the allocation rule
Y (v, g) = (Y1(v, g), . . . , Yn(v, g)),
which is uniquely determined by the following axioms:
A1. If S is a component of g then the members of the coalition S ought to allocate to themselves the
total value v(S) available to them, i.e ∀S ∈ N |g∑
i∈S
Yi(v, g) = v (S) . (2)
A2. ∀g, ∀ij ∈ g both players i and j obtain equal payoffs after adding or deleting a link ij,
Yi (v, g)− Yi (v, g − ij) = Yj (v, g)− Yj (v, g − ij) . (3)
Let us determine the characteristic function by the following way
vg (S) =
∑
K∈S|g
v (K) .
Then the Myerson value can be calculated by formula
Yi (v, g) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
(vg (S ∪ i)− vg (S))
s! (n− s− 1)!
n!
, (4)
where s = |S| , n = |N | .
3. Centrality measure for weighted network using Myerson value
Consider a game where the graph g is a tree which consists on n nodes and characteristic function is
determined by the scheme proposed by Jackson [12]: every direct connection gives to coalition S the
impact r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Moreover, players obtain an impact from non-direct connections. Each path
of length 2 gives to coalition S the impact r2, a path of length 3 gives to coalition the impact r3, etc. So,
for any coalition S we obtain
v (S) = a1r + a2r
2 + · · ·+ akrk + · · ·+ aLrL =
L∑
k=1
akr
k, (5)
where L is a maximal distance between two nodes in the coalition; ak is the number of paths of length k
in this coalition.
v(i) = 0, ∀i ∈ N.
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Let us define the allocation rule in this cooperative game in the following form
Yi (w, g) =
σ1(i)
2
r +
σ2(i)
3
r2 + · · ·+ σL(i)
L+ 1
rL =
L∑
k=1
σk(i)
k + 1
rk, (6)
where σk(i) is a number of the paths of the length k which include i. In [15] it is proven that this
allocation rule for unweighted graphs is the Myerson value.
The Myerson value for player i depends on the number of paths that it lies on. Consequently, large
Myerson value corresponds to large number of paths which follow over this node. Therefore, Myerson
value can be used as a centrality definition for the nodes in the network.
We can apply this approach to weighted networks. Consider a weighted graph with integer weighted
links. Transform each link of the weight n into n parallel links of the weight 1. We obtain a multigraph.
The shortest path between two nodes is determined the same way as in the unweighted graph. But the
number of geodesics becomes larger because of the multi-links. If the nodes i1 and i2 are connected by
m links and the nodes i2 and i3 are connected by n links then the nodes i1 and i3 are connected by m · n
paths. Applying the formula (6) to the nodes of multigraph we derive the centrality value for weighted
graph.
Example 1.
Consider as a simple example the weighted graph (Fig. 1) with the matrix of weights:

A B C D
A 0 1 3 1
B 1 0 2 0
C 3 2 0 0
D 1 0 0 0

First, calculate the betweenness centrality (1) without taking into account the weights. The nodes B
and C have the equal values for centrality (see Table 1). In case of weighted graph it is intuitively clear
that the node C has a centrality value larger than a value of the node B because C is connected with the
node A with larger weight than with the node B.
Figure 1. Weighted graph.
Transform this graph into multigraph (Fig. 2) and calculate the Myerson value.
We begin from the node A. Enumerate all geodesics which contain the node A.
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Figure 2. Multigraph.
The paths of length 1: {A,B}, {A,D}; and three paths {A,C}. Thus, σ1(A) = 5.
The paths of length 2: {B,A,D}, three paths {C,A,D} because A and C are connected by three
links, so σ2(A) = 4.
Then by formula (6) we have
YA(G) =
5
2
r +
4
3
r2.
In a similar manner for the other players we obtain
YB(G) =
3
2
r +
1
3
r2.
YC(G) =
5
2
r + r2.
YD(G) =
1
2
r +
4
3
r2.
The results of calculation of the Myerson centrality measure for r = 0.2 are presented in Table 1. It
confirms our expectation that the centralities of nodes B and C are different in the weighted setting.
The complexity of this algorithm depends on an algorithm of determination of shortest paths in the
network. In [15] the algorithm based on the generating function for unweighted graph is proposed. This
algorithm can be converted for the weighted graph.
Consider the tree gp = (N,E) with the root in the node p. Introduce the generating function
ϕp(x) =
L∑
k=1
αpkx
k
where αpk is the number of paths which consist of k nodes (length k − 1) and contain the node p.
To find this value we use a modified algorithm proposed by Jamison [13] for computing the generat-
ing function for the number of sub-trees of a tree g which contain k nodes of the tree g.
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Table 1. Myerson centrality for weighted graph from four nodes
Nodes A B C D
Classical betweenness centrality
2 0 0 0
Myerson
centrality (r = 0.2) 0.5533 0.3133 0.5400 0.1534
Let us calculate the generating function via recurrence relations. First, we determine the generating
functions in the final nodes (leaves) of the tree gp. Let q be such a node. Then,
ϕq(x) = x.
Denote l the number of players in a path of maximal length {p, . . . , q}. Consider the nodes q such
that the length of path {p, . . . , q} is equal to l − 1. If it is not the root p then
ϕq(x) = x
(
1 +
d∑
i=1
ϕqi(x)
)
(7)
where the sum is calculated in all descendants qi, i = 1, . . . , d of the node q. Continue the process until
l = 2.
For l = 2 the generating function is determined for all descendants of the node p. Then, we have
ϕp(x) = x
1 + d∑
i=1
ϕqi(x) +
∑
i 6=j
ϕqi(x)ϕqj (x)
 (8)
where the sum is calculated in all descendants qi, i = 1, . . . , d of the node p.
The proof is based on the following arguments. Let q1, . . . , qd are the descendants of the node q 6= p.
Then any path from the node q to a node s in the tree gq passes through one of nodes qi, and the difference
in path lengths is equal to unity.
But if q = p then to paths containing k nodes with the origin in node p we must add paths with k
nodes which pass through the node p and can be composed from paths containing k1 < k nodes in the
tree gqi and paths containing k − k1 nodes in the tree gqj , where i 6= j. The number of such composed
paths is determined by the product in the second sum of expression (8).
This method to determine the number of paths using the generating function can be applied for the
weighted graph with the only difference that when we rise up to the root, the sub-tree in any node is
copied as many times as there are parallel links in the node. That is, in all nodes we calculate ϕq(x) =
x(1 +
∑
iw(q, qi)ϕqi(x)), where qi are offsprings of q and w(q, qi) is weight of the link (q, qi). But in
the root of the tree
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ϕp(x) = x
1 + d∑
i=1
w(p, qi)ϕqi(x) +
∑
i 6=j
w(p, qi)ϕqi(x) · w(p, qj)ϕqj (x)
 (9)
Example 2. We demonstrate the method using the generating function to calculate the centrality of the
node 4 for the tree presented on Fig. 3. Let node 4 be the root of the tree.
Figure 3. Two weighted stars.
For the final nodes (leaves) of the tree we set
ϕ6(x) = ϕ7(x) = ϕ8(x) = ϕ9(x) = ϕ10(x) = ϕ11(x) = ϕ12(x) = ϕ13(x) = x.
For other nodes we calculate
ϕ1(x) = x(1 + ϕ6(x) + 2 · ϕ7(x) + ϕ8(x) + 2 · ϕ9(x)) = x(1 + 6x);
ϕ5(x) = x(1 + 3 · ϕ10(x) + ϕ11(x) + 2 · ϕ12(x) + ϕ13(x)) = x(1 + 7x);
ϕ2(x) = x(1 + ϕ1(x)) = x(1 + x+ 6x
2);
ϕ3(x) = x(1 + ϕ2(x)) = x(1 + x+ x
2 + 6x3);
And for the root 4 by formula (9) we obtain
ϕ4(x) = x(1+4·ϕ3(x)+ϕ5(x)+4·ϕ3(x)·ϕ5(x)) = x+5x2+15x3+36x4+56x5+52x6+168x7.
Thus, σ1(4) = α42 = 5;
σ2(4) = α
4
3 = 15;
σ3(4) = α
4
4 = 36;
σ4(4) = α
4
5 = 56;
σ5(4) = α
4
6 = 52;
σ6(4) = α
4
7 = 168.
By formula (6), we finally obtain
Y4(G) =
5
2
r + 5r2 + 9r3 +
56
5
r4 +
26
3
r5 +
168
7
r6.
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4. Electric measure of centrality based on Kirchhoff’s law
Consider a weighted graph G = (N,E,W ), where N is the set of nodes, E is the set of links, and W is
the matrix of weights:
W (G) =

0 w1,2 . . . w1,n
w2,1 0 . . . w2,n
...
...
. . .
...
wn,1 wn,2 . . . 0
 ,
where wi,j ≥ 0 is the weight of the link connecting the nodes i and j, n = |N | is the number of nodes.
Note that wi,j = 0 if nodes i and j are not adjacent. Let G be the undirected graph, i.e. wi,j = wj,i.
Next we introduce the diagonal degree matrix:
D(G) =

d1 0 . . . 0
0 d2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . dn
 ,
where di =
∑n
j=1wi,j is the sum of weights of the edges which are adjacent to node i in graph G.
Definition. The Laplacian matrix L(G) for weighted graph G is defined as
L(G) = D(G)−W (G) =

d1 −w1,2 . . . −w1,n
−w2,1 d2 . . . −w2,n
...
...
. . .
...
−wn,1 −wn,2 . . . dn
 (10)
Let the graph G′ be converted from the graph G by extension of an additional node n+ 1 connected
with all nodes of the graph G with the links of constant conductivity δ. Thus, we obtain the Laplacian
matrix for the modified graph G′ as:
L(G′) = D(G′)−W (G′) =

d1 + δ −w1,2 . . . −w1,n −δ
−w2,1 d2 + δ . . . −w2,n −δ
...
...
. . .
...
...
−wn,1 −wn,2 . . . dn + δ −δ
−δ −δ . . . −δ δn

(11)
Suppose that a unit of current enters into the node s ∈ V and the node n + 1 is grounded. Let ϕsi
be the electric potential at node i when an electric charge is located at the node s. The vector of all
potentials ϕs(G′) = [ϕs1, . . . , ϕ
s
n, ϕ
s
n+1]
T for the nodes of the graph G′ is determined by the following
system of equations (the Kirchhoff’s law):
ϕs(G′) = L(G′)−1b′s, (12)
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where b′s is the vector of n+ 1 components with the values:
b′s(i) =
{
1 i = s,
0 otherwise.
(13)
Laplacian matrix (10) is singular. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the potential in the node
n+ 1 is equal to 0. Thus, from (11) it follows:
ϕ̃s(G′) = L̃(G′)−1bs, (14)
where ϕ̃s(G′), L̃(G′) and bs are obtained from (11) by deleting of row and column corresponding to the
node n+ 1. Notice that in ϕs(G′) and b′s zero elements are deleted. It yields
ϕ̃s(G′) = [D(G)−W (G) + δI]−1bs, (15)
where I is a unity matrix of size n.
The potential values can be determined up to a constant. Then, we can consider the vector ϕ̃s(G′) as
the potential values for the nodes of the graph G, that is,
ϕ̃s(G) = [L(G) + δI]−1bs.
Rewrite (15) in the following form:
ϕ̃s(G) = [(D(G) + δI)−W (G)]−1bs =
= [I − (D(G) + δI)−1D(G)D−1(G)W (G)]−1(D(G) + δI)−1bs.
The matrices (D(G)+δI)−1 and (D(G)+δI)−1D(G) are diagonal with the elements 1di+δ and
di
di+δ
, i =
1, ..., n, denote it as D1 and D2, respectively. The matrix D−1(G)W (G) is stochastic. Denote it as P .
Consequently,
ϕ̃s(G) = [I −D2P ]−1D1bs =
∞∑
k=0
(D2P )
kD1bs. (16)
From (16) it follows that the potential vector can be calculated by the recursion:
ϕ̃sk+1(G) = D2Pϕ̃
s
k(G) +D1bs, ϕ̃
s
0(G) = 0.
According to Ohms law, the current let-through the link e = (i, j) is xse = |ϕsi −ϕsj | ·wi,j . Consequently,
given that the electric charge is in the node s, the mean value of the current passing through node i is as
follows:
xs(i) =
1
2
(bs(i) +
∑
e:i∈e
xse), (17)
where
bs(i) =
{
1 i = s,
0 otherwise.
Thus, the electric centrality measure in node i for the weighted graph, CFB(i), can be determined by the
formula:
CFB(i) =
1
n
∑
s∈V
xs(i). (18)
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5. The Myerson value and cooperative game corresponding to the model
of electric circuit
The model of electric circuit related to the weighted graph can be used for the determination of the
characteristic function of a cooperative game. The utility of a coalition in this game is a total current
passing through the nodes of the corresponding coalition. For that let us slightly modify the model
eliminating the charge. Notice that the component 12bs(i) in formula (17) gives the equal impact for all
nodes of the coalition. So, this part of the current is not important for the comparing the nodes in the
coalition.
Thus, determine the characteristic function in the cooperative game as
v(K) =
1
|K|
∑
s∈K
xsK , K ⊂ V,
where
xsK =
1
2
∑
i∈K
∑
e:i∈e
xsi .
As a measure of centrality we can take the Myerson value in the cooperative game with the above
characteristic function.
Next we present the results of computer simulations for all introduced measures of the network
centrality.
Example 3.
Let us find the electric centrality for the weighted graph from Example 1. The results of the calcu-
lations are presented in Table 2. The data of Table 2 confirm once more that the node C has a value of
centrality larger than the centrality of the node B.
Table 2. Measures of centrality for weighted graph with four nodes
Nodes A B C D
Classical betweenness centrality
2 0 0 0
Electric
centrality (δ = 1) 0.4018 0.2679 0.3348 0.2277
Electric centrality
by Myerson (δ = 0.5) 0.3423 0.1862 0.2196 0.1204
Example 4.
Consider the graph of two stars presented in Fig. 3. First, let us calculate the electric centrality and
the Myerson centrality for the unweighted network and compare it with the PageRank Centrality. The
results of calculations are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Unweighted graph. The electric centrality (δ = 1), the Myerson vector (r = 0.2) and PageRank
Centrality (α = 0.85)
Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes PageRank
(CFB) by Myerson Centrality
1 0.2105 1 0.6588 1 0.1998
5 0.2105 5 0.6588 5 0.1998
2 0.1131 2 0.2955 2 0.0789
4 0.1131 4 0.2955 4 0.0789
3 0.1089 3 0.2635 3 0.0786
6 0.0716 6 0.1557 6 0.0455
7 0.0716 7 0.1557 7 0.0455
8 0.0716 8 0.1557 8 0.0455
9 0.0716 9 0.1557 9 0.0455
10 0.0716 10 0.1557 10 0.0455
11 0.0716 11 0.1557 11 0.0455
12 0.0716 12 0.1557 12 0.0455
13 0.0716 13 0.1557 13 0.0455
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We see that all three methods evaluate the nodes at the same order. The coefficient of correlation
between the values of electric centrality and Myerson centrality is equal to 0.999; the coefficient of
correlation between the values of electric centrality and PageRank Centrality is equal to 0.996.
Now consider this network of two stars with the weights and calculate the centrality measures for
this case; the results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Weighted graph. The electric centrality (δ = 1); the Myerson vector (r = 0.2)
Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality
(CFB) by Myerson
5 0.2399 5 1.2519
1 0.2316 1 0.9999
4 0.1363 4 0.7942
3 0.1307 3 0.7262
2 0.1173 10 0.5291
10 0.0856 2 0.3969
12 0.0814 12 0.3794
7 0.0811 7 0.3408
9 0.0811 9 0.3408
11 0.0722 11 0.2030
13 0.0722 13 0.2030
6 0.0722 6 0.1837
8 0.0721 8 0.1837
6. The results of computer simulations for social network
Here we consider the weighted graph derived from the popular Russian social network VKontakte. The
graph corresponds to the community devoted to game theory. This community consists of 483 partic-
ipants. As a weight of the link we take the number of common friends between the participants. In
fact, the probability that two participants are familiar depends on the number of common friends. This
approach is often used in the social network analysis.
In Fig. 4 the principal component of the community “Game Theory” consists of 275 nodes. It is
difficult to see from Fig. 4 which nodes are more important for the connection in the community. We
converted this graph to a new graph by deleting the links whose weights are less than three. This new
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Figure 4. Principal component of the community Game Theory in the social network VKontakte (275 nodes).
weighted graph is presented in Fig. 5. The thickness of a link depends on the weight of the link, i.e. on
the number of common friends.
The results of computing the electric centrality for the social network VKontakte are given in Table
5. Here the parameter δ = 1. In Table 6 there are results of computations for the Myerson centrality for
the network with r = 0.2. It is useful to compare these values of centrality with the results corresponding
to the classical notation of centrality using the shortest paths [18] for the parameter α = 1.5.
From Tables 5-7 we find that all three methods ranked two main nodes 1 and 8 in the same order.
The nodes 52, 56, 63, 69 are evaluated also as having large centrality. We can compare these methods
by computing the correlation between the rankings. The coefficient of correlation between the values
of electric centrality and Myerson centrality is equal to 0.929; the coefficient of correlation between
the values of electric centrality and the centrality given by the program “tnet” is equal to 0.953; the
coefficient of correlation between the Myerson centrality and the centrality given by the program “tnet”
is equal to 0.948. Thus, our main conclusion that the electric centrality measure correlates well with the
game-theoretic based centrality measures and less well with PageRank.
The figures of weighted graphs are prepared using the component NETDRAW from the program
package “UCINET” [3].
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Figure 5. Principal component of the community Game Theory in the social network VKontakte after deleting
the links weighted less than 3 (71 nodes).
16Avrachenkov K.E., Mazalov V.V., Trukhina L.I., Tsinguev B.T. / Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures for Weighted Graphs
Table 5. Social network VKontakte. The electric centrality (δ = 1))
Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality
(CFB) (CFB) (CFB) (CFB)
1 0.3267 14 0.04321 11 0.0247 71 0.0181
8 0.2521 22 0.04151 48 0.0241 38 0.0179
56 0.1095 5 0.0415 67 0.0236 61 0.0178
28 0.1045 4 0.0412 70 0.0222 57 0.0178
52 0.0915 34 0.0395 64 0.0213 21 0.0174
69 0.0872 20 0.03908 18 0.0203 43 0.0174
63 0.0778 25 0.03870 27 0.0197 59 0.0174
66 0.0738 32 0.0387 12 0.0197 26 0.0174
7 0.0640 60 0.03629 31 0.0196 65 0.0174
15 0.0638 50 0.03553 46 0.0193 51 0.0172
49 0.0632 36 0.03498 37 0.0191 30 0.0172
23 0.0615 45 0.0328 42 0.0189 40 0.0170
13 0.0602 35 0.0324 39 0.0189 41 0.0169
24 0.0590 16 0.0317 58 0.0188 17 0.0166
55 0.0553 62 0.0314 68 0.0185 3 0.0166
44 0.0530 19 0.0292 2 0.0183 54 0.0165
10 0.0516 33 0.0291 9 0.0182 29 0.0156
47 0.0470 6 0.0277 53 0.0182
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Table 6. Social network VKontakte. The Myerson centrality (r = 0.2)
Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality
1 4806,07 6 366,08 17 186,38 57 92,44
8 3732,69 64 350,86 5 185,13 38 92,29
52 1544,06 15 344,85 54 182,45 9 85,35
63 1436,29 55 339,23 49 165,20 41 85,00
7 1365,36 67 326,77 35 156,80 29 73,66
56 1328,20 13 306,28 3 150,95 70 71,23
69 1253,62 42 304,48 33 148,27 51 69,26
47 972,53 23 302,27 62 146,91 58 65,99
12 971,42 34 285,07 50 142,70 21 65,73
44 904,69 46 278,55 60 131,68 43 65,73
27 612,69 66 274,13 37 129,22 59 65,73
28 587,49 26 265,25 40 116,66 16 65,64
4 554,02 22 250,80 11 109,72 36 60,59
18 540,42 24 240,70 68 109,42 61 59,01
32 533,48 10 231,91 39 107,95 71 50,82
48 526,10 19 217,01 30 102,57 31 45,97
14 505,58 45 210,66 65 102,37 53 41,45
20 448,98 25 199,09 2 96,99
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Table 7. Social network VKontakte. The results of the program package tnet (α = 1.5))
Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality Nodes Centrality
1 1846 14 136 9 0 43 0
8 1398 25 136 11 0 45 0
52 500 4 69 12 0 46 0
69 494 5 69 17 0 48 0
47 384 10 69 18 0 51 0
44 331 19 69 21 0 53 0
63 331 20 69 26 0 54 0
7 325 28 69 27 0 57 0
55 265 32 69 29 0 58 0
15 228 35 69 30 0 59 0
66 203 50 69 31 0 61 0
24 194 62 69 33 0 64 0
13 137 36 27 37 0 65 0
22 137 16 8 38 0 67 0
23 137 60 8 39 0 68 0
34 137 2 0 40 0 70 0
49 137 3 0 41 0 71 0
56 137 6 0 42 0
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